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DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FOREIGN
INCOME TAX CREDIT
ANTHONY J. WATERS*
Section 901 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 grants a
credit against United States income tax liability in
the amount of any income... taxes paid or accrued during
the taxable year to any foreign country or to any possession
of the United States1
subject to certain rules and limitations, some founded in the regu-
lations, the revenue rulings and the case-law, some contained in
§§ 904 and 905 of the Code. This is a direct credit, by contrast
with the indirect, or "deemed paid" credits available under §§ 902,
960 and 963. Section 903 supplements § 901 by offering a direct
credit for taxes paid "in lieu of" income taxes. This article is
concerned with the definition of "income tax" applied in granting
credit under § 901.2 The several decisions under § 903 afford a
useful perspective on the question, and these will be discussed.3
But it is the large body of law applying § 901 which testifies to
the difficulty encountered in applying the term "income tax" to
the many and various foreign taxes for which a § 901 credit has
been sought. The Code itself offers no guidance, so it has been
for the Service and the courts to develop a "common law" defi-
nition.
The starting point of any inquiry into the qualification of a
foreign tax for credit is the application of the general criteria
laid down in the landmark case of Biddle v. Commissioner: 4
Section 131 [now § 901] does not say that the meaning of
its words is to be determined by foreign taxing statutes and
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 901.
2. Int Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 901-905. The provision for income taxes is the
only important part of these sections. There has never been a credit specifically for
a war profits tax, and there are very few decisions construing excess profits taxes.
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 56-51, 1956-1 Cum. BULL. 320, modifying Rev. Rul. 31, 1953-1
Cum. BULL. 225 (Cuba); Rev. Rul. 68-318, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 342 (Italy); Spec.
Rul. 3-28-40 (Mexico).
3. Infra at 228-31.
4. Mary Duke Biddle v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 573 (1938).
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decisions, and there is nothing in its language to suggest
that in allowing the credit for foreign tax payments, a shift-
ing standard was adopted by reference to foreign characteri-
zations and classifications of tax legislation. The phrase
"income taxes paid," as used in our own revenue laws, has
for most practical purposes a well understood meaning to be
derived from an examination of the statutes which provide
for the laying and collection of income taxes. It is that
meaning which must be attributed to it as used in § 131.1
In other words, where the tax in question conforms to the
United States concept of an income tax, determined by reference
to the federal income tax in fact levied domestically, it will qualify
for credit. The limitations put upon the foreign tax credit by the
rule in Biddle, construing a term not defined by the statute,
comport with a superficially attractive understanding of double
taxation, the avoidance of which is the policy behind the credit.
It was open to the Court in Biddle to define "income tax" so as
to effect an alleviation of double taxation in a broader and more
amorphous sense,6 but it did not do so. In view of the absence of
statutory guidance on point, the course it took must be regarded
as reasonable. But reasonable or not, it remains the fundamental
constraint upon the category of foreign income taxes which
qualify for credit. As we shall see, the constraint does no more
than define the question: What foreign taxes will qualify for
credit, given that the term "income tax" is used to mean "taxes
which come within the United States understanding of that term
as applied in domestic taxation"? It does not go far toward
providing any answers.
In passing on the question of credibility, the Service and
the courts have sought to satisfy three criteria:
(1) a foreign levy must be a tax
(2) based on income
(3) whose purpose is to reach that income.
5. Id. at 578-79.
6. Short of direct dependence upon other countries' classifications, with the
resultant "shifting standard," it was open to the Court to interpret the statutory
provision as being aimed at double taxation of that wealth which the United States
taxes as "income," rather than limiting it to a tax levied in conformity with the
domestic tax pattern.
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It is the requirement of a tax base consistent with the U.S. con-
cept of "income" which has caused most problems, and it is the
conformity of tax bases between this country and those whose
taxes are creditable that has kept the range of such taxes rela-
tively limited. The purpose requirement has also posed several
problems, not the least of which has been to discover the purpose
of a tax within a foreign system where its purpose has not been
expressly declared. Had all foreign countries borne the U.S. tax
credit in mind when creating their taxes, each would doubtless
have a "purpose" section conveniently labeled and translated into
English.
HISTORY
Before analyzing the detailed application of the statutory
scheme, it may be helpful to put the whole subject in context by
looking briefly at the history of the credit for foreign income taxes.
The foreign tax credit was introduced by the Revenue Act
of 1918. 7 Section 222 (a) and (b) applied to individuals, section
238 (a) to corporations. Previously, taxes other than the federal
income tax had been deductible in computing taxable income for
federal tax purposes.8 The principle of deductibility of other taxes
is as old as the United States income tax itself, having been con-
tained in the Civil War tax act of 1862 and again in the acts of
1865 and 1866.9 Congress had not yet addressed specifically
"foreign" taxes, but this was rectified by the Revenue Act of 1913
which specified "foreign" taxes as a deductible item in computing
7. Int. Rev. Code of 1918, §§ 222, 238 (now I.R.C. §§ 901-905).
8. Int. Rev. Code of 1917. The Internal Revenue Act of 1917, by §§ 1201(1),
1202(1), 1207(1) and 1207(2), amended the law as contained in the Internal Revenue
Act of 1916, §§ 5(a), 6(a), 12(a) and 12(b), amending the Internal Revenue Act
of 1913, §§ II(B) and II(G)(b). Prior to the 1917 amendments, federal income
taxes were deductible in the year in which paid. For example, if the taxpayer earned
$10,000 in 1914 and paid $500 tax on that income in 1915, then $500 was deductible
from his gross income for 1915. For a moderately hot debate on the 1917 amendments
abolishing this deduction for Federal income taxes paid, see 55 CoNG. REc. 6317-26
(1917). A proposed amendment to abolish deductions for all taxes was rejected.
See 55 CONG. REC. 6326-27 (1917).
9. Section 49 of the Revenue Act of 1861 (effective January 1, 1862) ends with
the capitalized words: PROVIDED THAT, IN ESTIMATING SAID INCOME,
ALL NATIONAL, STATE OR LOCAL TAXES ASSESSED UPON THE
PROPERTY, FROM WHICH THE INCOME IS DERIVED, SHALL FIRST
BE DEDUCTED. Similarly, § 91 of the Revenue Act of 1862, § 117 of the Revenue
Act of 1864 and the March 3, 1865 amendment to § 117 of the 1864 Act contained
deductibility provisions.
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corporate tax liability."0 In 1916 this was extended to individual
taxpayers." Although its details have been modified somewhat
in accommodating the credit, the provisions for deductibility con-
tained in § 164 of the I.R.C. are substantially identical to those
in effect once the 1916 legislation had extended the deduction for
foreign taxes to individuals.
The introduction of the tax credit in 1918 was the product of
two factors. First, after more than a century and a quarter as a
capital-importing nation, the United States had come of age and
was exporting capital on a sufficient scale to attract congressional
attention.12 Second, the sharp increase in income tax rates in
all countries affected by World War I added greatly to the burden
of international double taxation on United States taxpayers."a
Although one or two countries had used the credit device in de-
ference to taxation by their own colonies, the United States was
the first to adopt it on a world-wide basis. 4
United States jurisdiction to tax on a world-wide basis is
not seriously doubted. Cook v. Tait explicitly recognized the
power of the Federal Government to tax citizens on foreign-source
income and this is reflected in the language of I.R.C. § 61 (a)
which taxes "all income from whatever source derived."'15 It has
even been suggested that there is no constitutional limitation
on the authority of the United States to tax.' 6 In any case, juris-
dictional limitations with respect to foreign countries are a matter
of international law and generally this jurisdiction is asserted
on two bases: citizenship and source.'7 There is some disagree-
ment between international lawyers as to the need for presence
10. § II(G) (b) of the Revenue Act of 1913 included taxes "imposed by the
Government of any foreign country" (emphasis supplied).
11. § 5(a) (third) of the Revenue Act of 1916. Corresponding provisions for
nonresident aliens, domestic corporations and foreign corporations were contained
in §§ 6(a), 12(a) and 12(b), respectively.
12. Choate, Hurok and Klein, Federal Tax Policy for Foreign Income and
Foreign Taxpayers - History, Analysis and Prospects, 44 TEMP. L.Q. 441, 483 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Choate].
13. E. OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CRDIT 20 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
OWENS].
14. Id.
15. 265 U.S. 47, 54 (1924).
16. Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 282 (1914).
17. See generally Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign
Investment, 56 COLUm. L. Rxv. 815 (1956).
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or allegiance as a prerequisite for taxing aliens, 8 but essentially
none as to jurisdiction to tax citizens and residents. It follows
that the credit afforded by § 901 et seq. is in the nature of a
concession. The result has been described as the retention of tax
sovereignty based on citizenship together with a recognition of
the prior claim, based on source, of the country contributing most
to the production of income.19
But such a description may imply a conscious congressional
policy in an area in which, from the beginning, there has been
none:
In a very real sense, it is deceptive to speak of this.., as
the "tax policy" of the United States. In fact, it is quite
likely that Congress gave little or no thought to the effect of
the Revenue Act of 1913 on the foreign income of U.S.
persons or the U.S. income of foreign persons. This is a
distinction without a difference, however, since whether Con-
gress thought about it or not, a system for the taxation of
those types of income did result from the passage of the act.2c
Despite the subsequent importance of the tax treatment
of foreign-source income to the foreign investor, Congress has
continued to deal with the question only sporadically and in
oresponse to immediate pressures.
The history of the development of these tax rules, from
which the tax policy of the U.S. may be divined, has been a
meager one. For the most part, new rules have been developed
only when they became an obvious necessity. Congress, appar-
ently, has never treated the taxation of foreign income or
foreign taxpayers in isolation and, while there is a clear basic
policy underlying all of the rules - taxation of all income
of U.S. citizens and domiciliaries and taxation of only U.S.
18. Choate, supra note 12, at 446, nn.16-18. The effective jurisdiction of the
United States in taxing aliens was increased by the Foreign Investors Tax Act of
1966, which included for the first time certain foreign source income in the taxable
income of foreign persons. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 872(a) and 882(b). This was
the first explicit congressional endorsement of contract or allegiance as a basis for
jurisdiction to tax.
19. Comment, The Limitless Limits of the Foreign Tax Credit, 45 WASH. L.
REv. 347, 350 (1970).
20. Choate, supra note 12, at 481.
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income of foreigners - that policy is nowhere explicitly laid
down.2 1
The ad hoc grafting of new complexities onto old rules is no way
to develop a cohesive statutory scheme. It reflects the fitful
congressional approach to the subject, and what conscious policy
there has been is presumably reflected in the several amendments
to the 1918 credit provision.
Until amended by the Revenue Act of 1921, the credit pro-
vided by §§ 222 and 238 resulted in less than full taxation of
domestic income in the case of some taxpayers whose foreign
income was taxed at a higher rate than domestic. This curious
result was made possible by the absence of any limit on the
foreign tax credit, so that where the foreign rate exceeded the
domestic, the difference simply reduced U.S. tax liability, pro-
vided only that there was sufficient domestic income to incur
that liability. The act of 1921 limited the credit to the ratio of
foreign income to the taxpayer's world-wide income. This had
the effect of ensuring full taxation of domestic income at the
prevailing domestic rates.2 In 1932, Congress extended the ratio
principle to create a "per-country" limitation2 3 despite substantial
opposition in the Senate.24 While the 1921 amendment had
limited the credit to the amount of U.S. tax liability on all
foreign income, the 1932 amendment did the same thing with
income from each country individually. The later provision seems
to have been the vestige of a House attempt to abolish the credit
altogether so as to encourage investment at home 25 and was
itself partly motivated by that factor.26 Another reason given was
what was considered to be unfair discrimination in favor of those
taxpayers who operated in both high- and low-tax countries and
thus could average for credit purposes. 27
21. Id. at 442.
22. Revenue Act of 1921, §§ 22(a) (5) and 238(a). The Report of the House
Ways and Means Committee speaks of ending the "abuse" of the foreign tax credit
which tends to "wipe out part of our tax properly attributable to income derived
from sources within the United States." H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 13 (1921).
23. Revenue Act of 1932, § 131(b).
24. See H. WELLS, UNITED STATES DOUBLE TAXATION POLIcIEs 29 (1950).
25. See 75 CONG. REc. 6169-70, 6489-93, 6497-6504, 7047-54 (1932).
26. H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12, 23-24 (1932); 75 CONG. REC.
6490-93 (1932).
27. Id.
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The 1932 legislation reflects an uncharacteristic congressional
attention to detail in this area, and the basic limitation on the
credit has aptly been described as "perhaps [the] most stringent"
modification of the foreign tax credit since its inception.2 As it
now stands,29 the law ensures that at least the prevailing U.S.
tax rate will be levied on world-wide income.
In 1934, the House Ways and Means Subcommittee renewed
the attack upon the foreign tax credit per se.80 Its report was not
accepted by the Committee which did, however, recommend an
amendment to the credit limitation which would have ensured
revenue to the United States on at least half of any foreign
income of a U.S. taxpayer."' The Senate finally rejected this
proposal on the strength of its Finance Committee Report 2 and
the foreign tax credit survived unscathed. Nevertheless, hearings
on the House proposals resulted in perhaps the most thorough
presentations of the case for and against the credit to date. These
are worth summarizing.
There were three main lines of argument in favor of abolish-
ing the credit. First, it was said to discriminate against domestic
taxpayers, who could only deduct their non-federal taxes. 3 Sec-
ond, it allegedly constituted an unfair advantage to corporations
operating abroad in that it lowered their operating costs and,
third, this rendered certain U.S.-produced exports uncompeti-
tive. By way of response, the pro-credit lobby argued that there
was no discrimination against purely domestic corporate tax-
payers, at any rate, since U.S. corporations with foreign sub-
sidiaries paid at least the domestic tax rate and, in any event,
85% of dividends received by domestic corporations from their
domestic subsidiaries were exempted from tax by § 26 of the
Code. Further, arguments about blocking U.S. exports were
countered with evidence that many of the foreign subsidiaries in
28. Choate, supra note 12, at 460.
29. The 1954 Code abolished the overall limitation, but it was restored in 1960.
By the 1976 Tax Reform Act, § 1031, the per-country limitation is abolished, effective
January 1, 1977.
30. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
31. Id. at 15.
32. S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934).
33. A Fifth Amendment challenge to the foreign tax credit on almost precisely
these grounds failed in a case which was disposed of on jurisdictional grounds, but
which rejected the constitutional claim by way of dictum: George W. Helme Co. v.
United States, 87 Ct. Cl. 474, cert. denied, 306 U.S. 645 (1938).
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question were assembly and distribution centers which actually
furthered exports.
This was bolstered by the results of a survey conducted by
the American Exports Manufacturers Association which indicated
that 34 of the 155 corporations polled thought the abolition of
the credit would certainly drive them out of business and a further
56 thought that it might have that effect. Corporate emigration
was also raised as a possible result of abolition. 4
The complete victory of the retentionist lobby is some indi-
cation of the importance of the credit to American corporations.
The evidence of those most directly affected suggests that since
its introduction in 1918 the credit has become one of the most
important factors in determining patterns of corporate investment.
In 1942, the 1939 Code was amended, in the face of World
War II, to effect a liberalization in the application of § 131, the
predecessor of the present § 901. The option of a credit or
deduction, useful to the taxpayer for whom a very high foreign
rate would make the (limited) credit less attractive than the
(unlimited) deduction, was introduced.85 So was the new pro-
vision by which foreign taxes "in lieu" of an income tax are
creditable, together with a liberalization of the rules relating to
second-tier foreign subsidiaries.3 6
In 1954, the overall limitation on the credit was abolished,
leaving only the per-country limitation, which favored that nar-
row class of taxpayer which incurred a loss abroad while making
a profit at home. 7  (The per-country limitation results in this
loss being offset against U.S. tax; the overall limitation does not,
unless there is an overall loss.) In 1960, the overall limitation
was restored as an alternative,38 and by § 1031 of the 1976 Tax
Reform Act the per-country method is abolished (save for income
from U.S. possessions) for tax years ending after 1975, and all
taxpayers are required to use the overall method.39 Also in 1954,
34. See WELLS supra note 24, at 31-33 and authorities cited in nn. 35-46 therein,
especially American Branch Factories Abroad, S. Doc. No. 258, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1930).
35. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 131(a), now § 904.
36. Id. § 131(h).
37. Id. § 131(f).
38. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 904(a) 2.
39. See H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976), § 1031, as amended. Con-
gressional intent is unclear, but conversations with staffers indicate a "consenus" that
the amendment is aimed at oil company abuses and will have little effect outside that
industry.
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§ 904 (d) was enacted; unused credit could be carried over from
one year to another within certain limits. This remains in
force. In 1958, the five-year carryover and two-year carryback
provisions were introduced 40 and in 1962 the "grossing up" pro-
visions were introduced with the aim of equalizing foreign and
domestic dividends received by parent corporations.4 ' In 1969,
a safeguard against double credit was brought in in the form
of a greater limitation on credit where a loss in earlier years has
created a tax benefit.42 The 1969 Act also introduced a special
limit with respect to mineral income to prevent the use of excess
credit in reducing U.S. tax on other foreign income.43
These sporadic amendments may reflect changes in economic
climate, balance of payments pressures, political movements for
or against isolationism, and the like, but the firmly-entrenched
foreign tax credit remains a focal point in the world of corporate
foreign investment.
While the... history shows that the foreign tax credit can
be used to expand or restrict foreign investment and is to
this extent a viable tool for the implementation of govern-
mental non-tax policy, the minor changes in the taxing policy
over the years indicate a recognition on the part of Congress
that economic double taxation is basically unfair and dis-
criminatory against foreign investment. Thus Congress has
resisted the temptation to eliminate the credit to increase
revenue and has contented itself with setting up a series of
limitations to safeguard against abuse."
APPLICATION
Having briefly traced the fitful history of the credit, we may
now turn to a detailed examination of the way in which it has
been applied. Because the meaning of "income tax" is determina-
tive of the scope and effect of § 901, that will be our central focus
in asking whether the adjudicative policy in this field is more
coherent than the legislative. It may be helpful to examine the
decisions in terms of the three requirements suggested above:
40. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 904(d).
41. Id. § 902(a).
42. Id. § 905(c).
43. Id. § 901 (e) ; and see generally Rendell, Developments in Foreign Tax
Credit: How It Affects Doing Business Abroad, 37 J. TAX. 298, 299 (1972).
44. Choate supra note 12, at 461-62.
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(1) that there be a tax (2) based on income (3) designed to
reach that income.
1. ATax
Only one levy has failed to qualify specifically on the grounds
that it was not a tax.15 This was an Ecuador levy under the
Labor Code of that country. The proceeds were paid to a works
council which distributed it to employees in the form of benefits.
This profit-sharing element, and some suggestion in the ruling
that regulation of business,16 rather than the raising of revenues,
was the motive behind it, combined to produce a denial of credit.
It has been suggested, however, that the main ground of decision
was not articulated in the ruling. This was that the monies levied
never entered the general exchequer but were repaid to em-
ployees of the taxpayer.4 7 It may be that the grounds actually
given, particularly that the function of the levy was to control
business ("for the purposes of enforcing the Labor Code") are
less than convincing. But to suggest that the true ground of
decision was one which went unmentioned is to do what the
author who made that suggestion declares to be necessary in
analyzing the whole area before us - "At various crucial
points . .. it becomes necessary to guess what principles and
lines of demarcation the Service may have had in mind." 48 There
can be no doubt that the absence of articulated grounds for
decision is the main obstacle to meaningful analysis in this area.
But the particular inquiry as to what is a tax, as contrasted to
other, non-creditable levies, has not raised many problems. In-
deed, it often appears that if all other requirements are met -
essentially that there is a levy upon net income for the purpose
of revenue-raising - then for credit purposes the impost is neces-
sarily a tax. To hold otherwise would be to make a distinction
without a difference.
This is demonstrated by a 1974 ruling allowing credit for
payments voluntarily made to a corporation wholly owned by the
Brazilian Government. 49  The corporation was set up for the
45. I.T. 3768, 1945 CuM. BULL. 204.
46. Article 374 of Presidential Decree No. 210, dated August 5, 1938, provided
for contribution of five percent of net profits as the "means of raising the funds
for the purpose of enforcing the Labor Code ...." Id. at 204.
47. OWENS supra note 13, at 32.
48. Id. at 31.
49. Rev. Rul. 74-58, 1974 INT. REV. BumL. No. 5, at 13.
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furthering of literacy and adolescent education. Once the tax-
payer had elected to make such payments, they were treated
exactly like income tax so far as due dates and penalties were
concerned. They were creditable against the Brazilian income tax
up to a 2% ceiling. As a result, these optional donations were
treated by the Service as taxes:
Amounts of taxes paid directly to a public benefit corpora-
tion rather than to a govermnent's general revenue fund con-
stitute "taxes" if the corporation has been created for a public
purpose and is regarded as performing a governmental func-
tion for which public money may be appropriated.50
As a matter of statutory interpretation, such payments might
better have qualified for credit as a tax "in lieu" of income tax
under § 903, to be discussed later.51 But in the light of the limita-
tions put upon the "in lieu" provision by the Service,52 and be-
cause of the way in which this contribution was calculated, with
consequences of non-payment and late payment the same as
for the income tax itself, the Service was evidently content to
credit a voluntary, charitable contribution as an income tax.
It may fairly be concluded from the Brazilian ruling, and
from others like it concerning, for example, the New York City
Educational Construction Fund,53 the Canadian Old Age Security
Tax,54 employees' contributions under the British National In-
surance Act 55 and a West German surcharge on taxes already
qualifying for credit56 that the definition of "tax" has really
50. Id.
51. See discussion, infra 228-31.
52. See Reg. 1.903-1 and Rev. Rul. 67-308, 1967-2 CuM. BULL. 254, superseding
Rev. Rul. 57-153, 1957-1 Cum. BULL. 243, which revoked 0. D. 253, 1 CuM. BULL.
162. The effect of these limitations (see note 51, supra) is that the category of taxes
credited under § 903 is limited to those which the taxing country has applied as a
matter of administrative convenience because, for some reason, computation of taxable
income is difficult. Given the narrowness of this category, the main credit provision,
§ 901, better applied to the Brazilian levy. The statutory language, however, clearly
suggests that § 903 was the more appropriate provision on these facts.
53. Rev. Rut. 71-49, 1971-1 Cum. BuL. 103.
54. Rev. Rul. 67-328, 1967-2 CuM. BuLL. 257; see and compare Rev. Rul. 68-411,
1968-2 Cum. BULL. 306 which held creditable levies made under the Canadian Pension
Plan on employed and self-employed persons.
55. Rev. Rul. 72-579, 1972-2 CuM. BULL 441.
56. Rev. Rut. 74-90, 1974-1 Cum. BuLL. 181. Once the original income tax
qualifies for credit, "An additional tax imposed as a percentage . . . thereof is itself
an income tax." Id. at 182.
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looked after itself in view of the other tests applied.57 Given the
attention which has been focused on these other elements, it is
not surprising that the separate question, "What is a tax?", has
not often been raised.
There is, however, one slightly murky area of the "tax" re-
quirement which could be described as an abuse of the tax credit
system. In 1957, Representative Vanik of Ohio spoke of "a
conspired avoidance of an income tax obligation on $300 million
of income per year.. ."IS by the Arabian-American Oil Company
(ARAMCO) pursuant to a "purported agreement" with King
Saud of Saudi Arabia, resulting in a 50-50 profit-sharing between
the two, at the expense of the United States Treasury. A few
days later, ARAMCO replied to Mr. Vanik's written request for
"... compliance with the spirit as well as the letter . . ." of the
Code by stating that they had properly credited income taxes
paid, as all U.S. taxpayers were permitted to do. The "royalties"
of which Mr. Vanik had written were deducted by ARAMCO as
permitted by the Code. Representative Vanik noted that there
had been a "shift in emphasis" between royalties and taxes.
Because taxes are creditable, royalties only deductible, U.S.
oil companies prefer - understandably enough - that the source-
country raise its revenue in the form of taxes, up to the point at
which further taxes would not be creditable.5 9 Beyond that point,
royalties (that is, levies based on the quantity or value of oil
57. The common feature of the levies at issue in the Rulings cited in notes 52-55,
supra, is that they created a fund to be used for a specific purpose. In discussing the
New York City levy (for which deductibility under §§ 164, 216 was sought) the
Service acknowledged that "tax" was nowhere defined in the Code and that a fund
raised for a specific purpose suggested a "regulatory" or "privilege" levy rather than
a "tax." This implies that a tax must have no purpose more specific than the general
raising of revenue. (See and compare case cited in note 130, infra). But the Service,
reaching back to an earlier Ruling, found a definition of "tax" broad enough to
include the levy at issue: "An enforced contribution, exacted pursuant to legislative
authority in the exercise of the taxing power, and imposed and collected for the
purpose of raising revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes." Rev. Rul.
61-152, 1961-2 Cum. BULL. 42. This definition would not cover the Brazilian levy,
which was not "enforced." The other Rulings ignored the issue altogether, resting
content with a conformity of "tax base" to the domestic-tax base, even where the
foreign "taxing" statute did not use the word "tax."
58. 103 CONG. RC. 2248 (1957).
59. See generally, Taking the "Am" out of Aramco, FORBES MAGAZINE, December
15, 1976, at 37, which offers an interesting insight into the history of this aspect of
the tax credit.
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extracted rather than on gain) are preferable. Since the form in
which revenue is raised matters little to the country concerned,
oil-producing countries have been happy to oblige their American
customers. For the corporation,, substantial savings can result -
all, as Representative Vanik put it, "at the expense of the United
States Treasury." This is the "shift in emphasis" between royal-
ties and taxes to which he referred. The shift was facilitated by
the Service and the courts, who based the determination of what
is and is not an "income tax" on the mechanics, never asking
whether it was a subterfuge for something else. If form was to
govern creditability, then the prudent course was to follow the
form.
It has been suggested that the correct approach to the oil-
tax cases is to separate that part of the tax which is, in reality,
a royalty and deny credit for it: form should not govern credita-
bility.60 But, of course, it does. In an ironic sense, this is the
consequence of decisions which derive from the Biddle rule in
holding the category of creditable taxes tightly in line with U.S.
concepts. Once that considerable requirement has been met, (and
on occasion oil-company-inspired lawyers have insured that it
has), it would seem churlish to deny that form governs.
II. The Tax Base
The conformity of tax base between the taxing country and
the United States is the major controlling influence in this area.
As we have seen, Biddle v. Commissioner sets out the criteria to
be applied.61 The question before the Supreme Court in Biddle
was whether the U.S. taxpayer claiming the credit had paid the
tax, or whether the British corporation of which she was a stock-
holder had done so. Though the case is now cited as authority
for the criteria governing creditability, it established those criteria
in response to the question: whose income? That narrow ques-
tion is but tangentially related to the main inquiry of this article,
but since its resolution provided the occasion for the formulation
of the basic rules determining qualification under § 901, a his-
torical note seems in order.
Under Rule 20 of the Income Tax Act of 1918, the United
Kingdom Corporation of which Biddle was a stockholder had
60. OWENS, supra note 13, at 33.
61. Supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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withheld income tax from dividends paid to her.62  This was
tax attributable to the surplus being distributed by the dividend.
This rule had been essentially unchanged since the Income Tax
Act of 1842, which itself preceded the first British Companies Act
by two years. The significance of that sequence is that it resulted
(indeed results) in a tax treatment of these incorporated bodies,
for present purposes, as though they were the effective partner-
ship to which the 1842 statute applied: joint-stock companies.
Since the tax paid by the partnership was the tax paid by its
partners, it would follow that tax withheld from a distribution of
surplus could correctly be regarded as tax paid by the partner
receiving it.68 It was against this historical background of British
tax law that Biddle was decided. 14 The word "company" as used
in the 1842 statute had referred to joint-stock companies, the only
companies then in existence. The passage of the Companies
Acts was never met by a corresponding change in the application
of the withholding rule for corporate dividends. There was, how-
ever, by section 27 (1) of the Finance Act of 1920, an amendment
whereby the tax withheld by the company is nevertheless to be
included in the stockholder's gross income for the purposes of
surtax and any possible tax refund. This feature was relied upon
by Biddle in support of her argument that she had paid the tax.
But the Court said:
Although the corporation, in the United Kingdom as here,
pays the tax and is bound to pay it, the tax burden in point
of substance is passed on to the stockholders in the same
62. Withholding was unknown to the United States tax system at this time; it
was not even used for wages.
63. Ironically, had the taxpayer in this case been a corporation rather than an
individual, the British company having been at least half-owned by the American,
then the tax paid would have been credited under the "deemed paid" rule now con-
tained in I.R.C. § 902(a) [then § 131(f)]. (The present-day requirement is that the
American corporation own at least 10% of the stock.) Is this because the U.S. tax
system, having developed after the birth of the corporation, recognized that the
corporate person which controls another corporate person acquires rights and duties
directly, without the dissonance inherent in the natural-person-as-shareholder arrange-
ment? Whatever the best explanation, there is some irony in the fact it was a foreign
tax system's failure to comprehend fully the characteristics of the corporate person
which gave rise to a tax which is usually recognized for credit to a corporate taxpayer,
but not to an individual.
64. For a fuller discussion, see Mitchell, The Credit for Foreign Income Tax
and Notes on the Historical Origin of the Biddle Case, 1 AM. U. TAX INST. 395,
412.
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way that it is passed on under our own taxing acts where
the tax on the corporate income is charged as an expense
before any part of the resulting net profit is distributed to
stockholders. 5
"[I]n point of substance," this was a tax upon the company's
profits before they reached the stockholder. In this analysis, it
was like the tax levied by the United States on corporate profits
and was not creditable to the stockholder.
For more than ten years prior to Biddle, the Service had ac-
cepted that the stockholder had paid the tax and was entitled
to credit. As there appears to be no other country which employs
the British method, it is doubtful whether the question will ever
be re-examined. The Biddle case is significant for the fineness
of the line it drew between creditable and non-creditable taxes.
But central to our inquiry is the requirement of similarity with
U.S. taxes for which this case is responsible.
Foremost among these similarity requirements is that the tax
be aimed at, even where not directly measured by, net income
as understood under the Internal Revenue Code. This in turn
requires some actual income in the Eisner v. Macomber sense of
"the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both com-
bined . . .provided it be understood to include profit gained
through a sale or conversion of capital assets .... ." The word
"derived" has long since been taken to require realization.
67 It
is for this reason that tax'paid (by a British subsidiary of a U.S.
parent) as an imputed rent tax, based on the value of the prop-
erty, was denied credit; the statute did not require that any rent
actually be received.68 Similarly denied credit was a Mexican
production tax which attached to the market value of ore pro-
duced whether sold or not,69 a Peruvian tax based on the value
of merchandise to be exported" and a Columbian patrimony tax
based on assets minus liabilities and not on "only those increases
65. 302 U.S. at 580 (1938).
66. 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1919).
67. See J. SNEED, THE CONFIGURATIONS OF GROSS INcOME 63-76 and authorities
cited therein (1967).
68. F. W. Woolworth v. United States, 91 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 768 (1938).
69. Commissioner v. American Metal Co., 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 829 (1955).
70. Rev. Rul. 74-373, 1974-2 Cum. BULL 203.
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in value of the property which are actually realized by the
owner . . ."71
Given a broad notion of avoiding double taxation, arguments
against these results might be that imputed income is a logical
concept of income, even though it is not a part of U.S. tax law;
that taxing ore before sale differs from U.S. practice only in
the matter of timing; and that a patrimony tax is a perfectly
proper way for a government to protect itself against less than
the property's full potential being realized. But these three are
landmark decisions which continue to control; they afford relief
from double taxation only in a narrow, almost mechanical sense.
A slightly different aspect of the conformity requirement is
raised by the Tax Court's refusal to credit a Canadian tax on the
income from a testamentary trust.7 2 The ground of decision was
simply that, at the time, such income was not taxed domestically.
There was no argument to the effect that this was not income,
or that it was not taxed. In other words, because Congress did
not tax such income domestically, there was no question of double
taxation. Today, the type of income involved in that case is tax-
able, so presumably credit would be allowed. 73
A German turnover tax applied to gross royalties received
by non-residents for the use of patents was denied credit because
of the predominant "turnover" nature of that tax,74 even though
an East German tax on gross royalties of non-residents has been
credited by analogy with I.R.C. §§ 871 and 881. 75 (There may
71. Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co., 26 T.C. 582, 587 (1956). The same tax
failed on the same grounds in Abbott Laboratories v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321
(:N.D. Ill. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1959).
72. Helena L. Wilson, 7 T.C. 1469 (1946).
73. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 652, 662, 663.
74. Rev. Rul. 56-635, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 501. The only description of the
German tax contained in the Ruling is: "The 'turnover' tax resembles a sales tax
but is broader in scope of application." Presumably, this is a tax on the turnover of
property - a tax upon an event or transaction rather than on a gain.
75. Rev. Rul. 73-159, 1973-1 CuM. BULL. 346. The tax here was imposed by
East Germany upon gross receipts from the permanent or temporary granting of
patents, trademarks and the like paid to persons not resident or domiciled in East
Germany. The taxpayer here was a domestic corporation whose income (royalty
payments) from an East German corporation had been subjected to the East German
tax at source. Although this tax would not have qualified as an income tax in the
ordinary sense, it was held creditable by analogy with I.R.C. §§ 871 and 881. § 871
(a) (1) (A) imposes a tax upon "the amount received from sources within the United
States by a nonresident alien individual as interest . . ., dividends, rents, salaries
[etc.] . . ." where that income is not connected with United States business. § 881 is
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be another rationale for crediting such gross taxes as these; the
rulings concerned are discussed below.) 76 The basis of this denial
is that the "turnover" nature of the statute under which the
tax was levied required no realization of income. This realization
requirement has resulted in the denial of credit for a tax on
capital, 77 on the value of bonds held,78 on farm land,79 on house-
hold appliances"0 and on personal wealth.8' On very similar
grounds, that part of a Swiss tax which applied to capital and
reserves was denied credit,82 as was a Venezuelan tax to the
extent that it was, in effect, based on an imputed dividend. 3 In
none of these cases was taxable income realized. The limiting
influence of Eisner v. Macomber in domestic taxation is precisely
reflected here.
In most of these cases, the foreign tax is of a kind which
does not require realization, indeed is conceptually inconsistent
with a realization requirement - typically, a tax on capital or
other property. These are direct taxes, as distinct from the in-
direct taxes to which Eisner v. Macomber effectively limited the
taxing power of Congress. In such cases, the denial of credit is
on two distinct grounds: first, the taxing statute has no Internal
Revenue Code counterpart; second, there is no income realized,
in the United States sense of realization. But there are cases in
which the taxing statute conforms to the similarity requirement,
a parallel provision which applies to foreign corporations. Since these are taxes upon
gross receipts, they bring the similar East German tax within the scope of the rule
in Biddle, namely that the credit be limited to taxes of the kind which exist within
the Internal Revenue Code. The Code provisions dealing specifically with the kind
of income involved here (§ 871 (a) (1) (D) and § 881 (a) (4) respectively deal with
"gains from the sale or exchange . . . of patents, copyrights, . . . and other like
property") use the term "gains" by contrast with the phrase "the amount received"
(§§ 871(a)(1) and 881(a)). This suggests that the East German tax was not the
mirror-image of the American; the Service had room for maneuver.
76. See text following note 86 inifra.
77. Rev. Rul. 68-318, 1968-1 Cum. BULL. 342 (Italy).
78. Rev. Rul. 69-82, 1969-1 CUM. BULL. 193 (Italy).
79. Rev. Rul. 69-480, 1969-2 CuM. BULL. 151. The tax at issue here was based
on the "cadastral" technique of taxing land on its potential value as farm land.
80. Rev. Rul. 72-235, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 439 (Holland).
81. Rev. Rul. 70-464, 1970-2 CUM.'BULL. 152; however, deductible where income-
producing (Switzerland).
82. Rev. Rul. 74-82, 1974-1 Cum. BULL. No. 181, modifying Rev. Rul. 69-446,
1969-2 CuM. BULL. 150 (Switzerland).
83. Rev. Rul. 75-377, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 294.
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but the transaction to which it is applied does not. That is, only
the second ground of decision applies: there has been no income
realized.
In Hugh C. Wallace, the French taxing statute conformed
to the similarity requirement, but was applied to rental property
whether actual rental income was received or not.8 4 In other
words, in cases involving unlet property the tax levied, based
upon rental value, was a tax on the property itself. In American
terms, there was no realization. Another case in which the trans-
action, rather than the taxing statute, failed to qualify for credit
was Burk Brothers.15 The taxpayer had bought goat skins in
Calcutta, where it had an office, and imported them to the United
States where they were manufactured into leather goods by the
taxpayer's own factory. Burk Brothers thus by-passed the
Indian skin exporting trade. Indian exporters were taxed on the
difference in value of the skins between the times they bought
and sold them: their income. Burk Brothers were taxed as though
this had happened because the Indian authorities viewed the
transaction as involving the production of wealth within India,
which wealth was subject to tax. But in American terms, there
was no taxable event; credit was denied.
So far, we have discussed only two requirements which the
"common law" of § 901 has produced: (1) that there be income
within the U.S. understanding of that term and (2) that it be
taxed broadly in the way that domestic income is taxed. Taken
together, these two basic limitations on the income tax credit
do no more than declare its outer limits. They serve to describe,
by inference, that large area of foreign taxation which is clearly
beyond the reach of the credit.
Within those outer limits, the questions which determine
creditability become more numerous and more refined. Even
after the two basic criteria have been met, the Service and the
courts have generally required a showing that what is being
taxed is a net gain corresponding to the federal tax concept of
taxable income. Numerous decisions deal with taxes levied on
gross income, rather than net, and we shall consider them next.
Then we shall examine the decisions concerning formulary taxes,
that is, taxes levied according to a formula designed to reach net
gain, rather than upon net gain itself.
84. 17 B.T.A. 406 (1929).
85. 20 B.T.A. 657 (1930).
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A. Taxes on Gross Income
Given the existence of income, as we understand it, and given
a method of reaching it which satisfies the Biddle rule of con-
formity, the next stage in the confining process is to satisfy the
requirement that the tax reach net gain. Where the taxing
country's concept of taxable income coincides with our own there:
is, of course, no problem. But where the income tax is levied on
gross income, a denial of credit solely on the grounds that the tax
base differs from the U.S. concept of taxable income would not
serve to minimize double taxation. That is to say that a tax
levied on gross income may very well reach net gain. Where it
does in fact reach net gain - that is, where some net gain is
included within the gross income being taxed - then the purpose
of the foreign tax credit is served by allowing credit, not by
denying it. The problem, of course, is to distinguish those taxes
on gross income which do reach net gain from those which do not.
The recent case of Bank of America N.T. & S.A. v. United
States86 provides an excellent vehicle for examining this distinc-
tion. Judge Davis's Court of Claims Opinion, by which he pur-
ports to reconcile all the law on point, is as good a summary of
the problem as may be found in the case law.
In the Bank of America case, the taxpayer sought to credit
Thai, Philippine and Buenos Aires taxes levied on the gross in-
come of its banking operations. The foreign statutes involved
permitted no deductions for expenses incurred for the production
of that income. The Court of Claims held, for the Service, that
these were not "income taxes" within the meaning of § 901.
Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States was denied.
Judge Davis's Opinion rests firmly on the proposition that
"in addition to the rule that the United States notion of income
taxes furnishes the controlling guide," there is the basic principle
that "gain is a necessary ingredient of income. ' s In principle,
a levy on gross income could be directed at net gain; where it is
clear that "the costs, expenses, or losses incurred ... would...
be the lesser part of the gross income" s such a tax qualifies for
credit. For example, an employee's foreign income tax paid on
gross income would be creditable because "it is almost universally
86. 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. C1. 1972).
87. Id. at 517.
88. Id. at 519.
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true that a wage or salary employee does not spend more on
expenses incident to his job than he earns in pay."89 In Bank of
America, there was no assurance that the gross income in question
would include any net gain. For that reason, the taxes did not
qualify for credit.
In analyzing the law on point, Judge Davis organizes the
rulings and the Code provisions around the determinative criterion
of the existence, or "very likely" existence, of net gain.
Two cases relied on by the taxpayer, each holding a tax on
gross income creditable, are examined. In Seatrains,90 the Cuban
government replaced a 6% tax on taxpayer's net income from a
transportation business with a 3% tax on gross income. The
Board of Tax Appeals, in upholding the taxpayer's claim, em-
phasized that the change had been made as a matter of admin-
istrative convenience, the 3 % reduction in tax rate being intended
to approximate the value of the deductions which had been
permitted under the former statute. There had been some diffi-
culty in administering the old law with respect to permissible
deductions, but the new was just as clearly intended to tax net
gain. Thus, the determinative criterion of "seeking out net gain" 91
was satisfied.
As far as it goes, Judge Davis's analysis of Seatrains seems
to support his central thesis. The case is dealt with more fully
below, 2 but it is enough to say here that it represented an expan-
sion of the category of taxes qualifying for credit. This expansion
was explicitly recognized, prior to the decision in Bank of America,
by the passage of the "in lieu" provision, now § 903, under which
the identical Cuban tax has since been held to qualify.93 In other
words, the tax in question was arguably not a true income tax
at all, and the enactment of the "in lieu" provision took it out
of the category of "income taxes" qualifying under § 901. It was,
for this reason, an inappropriate authority on which to rely.
But even Judge Davis's limited analysis of the case raises
one difficulty. If, as he puts it later in his opinion, "the key is
the effect of the foreign tax on net gain," 94 then the ultimate
89. Id.
90. Seatrains Lines, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942) nonacq.
91. 459 F.2d at 518.
92. See text accompanying note 115, infra.
93. I.T. 3903, 1948-1 CuM. BULL. 70. See also Reg. 1.903-1 (1964), apparently
describing this very tax.
94. 459 F.2d at 521.
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test must be the actual effect of the tax, irrespective of the think-
ing behind its enactment. Of course, some insight into what the
statute was designed to achieve is helpful, but determination of
creditability must turn on actual effect. A tax which "seeks nut"
net gain does not result in double taxation unless it actually
reaches net gain. The Seatrains case nowhere dealt with effect,
but only with purpose. It did not directly address the narrow
question in issue here and for this reason, as well as that already
discussed, is best disregarded.
The second case relied on by the taxpayer also involved a
tax on gross income which was held to qualify for credit. In
Santa Eulaia,95 a Mexican tax was levied on gross mining royal-
ties. Judge Davis explains the result this way: "[T]he taxpayer
did not operate the mine, retaining only the royalty right...
and it seems very clear that no costs or expenses of the tax-
payer in obtaining the royalties were likely to out-balance those
gains .. ."96 (Emphasis original). According to this characteri-
zation, a net gain was virtually certain, so that a tax on gross
income in fact reached net gain and thereby qualified for credit.
Be that as it may, the Tax Court's analysis in Santa Eulalia offers
only a modicum of support for Judge Davis's characterization.
The government had argued that the tax did not qualify for
credit, precisely because no expense deductions were permitted.
That is, the government argued, as they were to argue in Bank
of America itself, that a tax on gross income is per se disqualified
from creditability under § 901. Rather than discuss the likeli-
hood of reaching net gain, the Tax Court in Santa Eulalia stated
that "the allowance of deductions from gross income in computing
income tax is a matter of legislative grace .... -97 In other words,
the computation of taxable income need not be wholly according
to U.S. concepts in order that the tax qualify for credit. There
is no mention of the factor which Judge Davis singles out - the
virtual certainty that a net gain will occur.
The government, in Bank of America, relied on three cases
in which credit was denied. Judge Davis explains each of them
as dealing with situations in which there was no assurance of
net gain. In Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. Rothensies,9s a Quebec
95. 2 T.C. 241 (1943).
96. 459 F.2d at 520.
97. 2 T.C_. at 245.
98. 133 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1943).
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mining tax was held not creditable, on the grounds that it was a
privilege tax rather than an income tax, even though it was com-
puted on gross income. But Judge Davis terms it "significant"
that no general business deductions were permitted, saying that
such expenses "could easily have made the difference between a
net profit and a loss." 99 The second case was American Metal,00
also decided on the grounds that the tax in issue was "on the
privilege of mining." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
that case did not assert the proposition for which the govern-
ment relied on it, namely that no tax on gross income could
qualify for credit. Judge Davis noted that the court there had
emphasized that the tax was payable "even if the individual
miner makes no profits - even if, having severed the ore, he
makes no sales."101 The third case cited by the government,
Allstate Insurance Co., 10 2 involved a Canadian tax on insurance
premiums, levied irrespective of profit.
Each of these cases offers some support for the desirable
consistency which Judge Davis attempts to impose on this area,
but only the Allstate case was actually decided in terms of a
requirement of "some relation to the gain, profit or loss of the
taxpayer.' ' 0 3 The other two cases were decided purely on the
basis that a tax on an event or privilege is something other than
an "income tax" and therefore does not qualify for credit.
In the Keasbey & Mattison Co. case, Judge Smith, speaking
for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, offered virtually no
guidance as to how to distinguish a "privilege tax" from an income
tax. He held that the Quebec statute did not conform "to the
recognized criteria of an income tax" and emphasized that only
the expenses of operating the mine, and not those incident to
the general conduct of the business, were deductible. In the
view of the court, this singled out the activity, rather than the
production of income, as the taxable event. There was also the
possibility of tax liability despite an overall loss, and it was this
which Judge Davis took to be the principle of decision.
In American Metal, Judge Hincks's opinion for the Second
Circuit deals very thoroughly indeed with the nature of a privilege
99. 459 F.2d at 520.
100. 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955).
101. Id. at 139.
102. 419 F.2d 409 (Ct. C1. 1969).
103. Id. at 415.
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tax. His holding depends largely on the fact that the Mexican
Production Tax applied "forthwith upon the extraction of the
ore" and is levied "irrespective of the realization of cash pro-
ceeds.'104 The taxpayer's unsuccessful argument was that the
"exclusive badge" of a privilege tax was forfeiture of the right to
continue the activity upon failure to pay the tax. Terming this
argument "specious," Judge Hincks said that all depended on
"the nature and effect of the tax." He referred to Mexican laws,
which made clear that only the state could own mineral deposits
prior to actual mining, and referred to expert testimony that
putting the ore "into the economic current of things" was the
"creation of wealth [which] is subject to tax."'1 5 Rebutting the
taxpayer's argument that the variation of tax rate, according to
the value of the particular metal in the world market, indicated
a tax aimed at the ultimate gain, Judge Hincks said, "But
these . . . are factors which affect the value of the privilege."
Finally, he emphasized that the tax attaches even if the individual
miner makes no profits - indeed, even if he makes no sales.
Taken together, these factors distinguish a tax on the privilege of
mining from a tax on the income from the activity.
This is one of the very few judicial attempts really to dis-
tinguish a privilege tax from an income tax. Since the distinction
has been determinative in a few cases, it seems worth paying
attention to the factors emphasized by Judge Hincks. It was the
last of these - the irrelevance of net gain - which Judge Davis
emphasizes to the exclusion of the others.
Having dealt with the cases, Judge Davis turns to the rulings
and the Code. Of the four rulings involved, two were "summary
rulings [which] do not detail their reasoning" but, says Judge
Davis, the Service "must have assumed" that the income in-
volved is "rarely, if ever, wholly offset by the taxpayer's costs
or expenses. . . 6 The third ruling was decided by analogy
with domestic Code provisions with which Judge Davis deals
separately and the fourth, he admits, is "without any satisfactory
explanation."I'0
104. 221 F.2d at 138.
105. Id. at 137.
106. 459 F.2d at 522. The rulings concerned were Rev. Rul. 73-118, 1973-1 CuM.
BULL. 345; Rev. Rul. 73-159, 1973-1 CuM. BULL 346; Rev. Rul. 74-31, 1974-1 Cum.
BULL. 179; Rev. Rul. 75-164, 1975-1 CUM. BULL. 233.
107. Id.
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The Code provisions on which the plaintiff bank relied levy
tax on gross income'0 8 and so afford an analogy to satisfy the
Biddle rule of conformity. But Judge Davis, in discussing the
pertinent provisions, says that "The assumption is, as we under-
stand it, that such... taxpayers ... are very unlikely to have
expenses which will reduce to zero their net gains from the
taxed items."'1 9 These are taxes on the non-business gross income
of non-resident aliens"0 and on income "not effectively connected"
with trade or business within the United States and received by a
foreign corporation.11
1
Judge Davis succeeds in offering a unifying principle in an
area in which too little careful analysis has been done. Although
the body of law which he purports to reconcile is less consistent
than he would have us believe, his careful discussion affords at
least a starting point for future controversies and perhaps more
than that - a determinative criterion by which tribunals will
abide in future.
Before leaving this problem, it must be said that determining
creditability of taxes on gross income according to whether or
not a net gain is likely to be "caught," does raise one possible
problem. In a situation in which the net gain is small relative
to the gross income, it is conceivable that the tax levied would
exceed the gain. Yet according to Judge Davis's test, the tax
would be creditable. If so, the taxpayer would be doing better
than avoiding double taxation, for that part of the tax which
exceeds net gain should not, in theory, qualify." 2 This curious
possibility derives from the willingness of the courts, the Service
and Congress to rest content, under certain circumstances, with
an assurance that there is some net gain, rather than demand a
precise computation in line with United States concepts of taxable
income, consistent with the government's repeated urgings.
B. Formulary Taxes
We have discussed decisions concerning the creditability of
taxes on gross income before discussing those concerning taxes
108. See notes 110, 111, infra.
109. 459 F.2d at 523.
110. I.R.C. §§ 871, 1441.
111. I.R.C. § 881.
112. That is to say, in circumstances in which the taxpayer's net gain is, let us
say, 2% of gross income, a tax of 3% would nevertheless qualify for credit if Judge
Davis's criteria were satisfied.
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for which the income tax credit is clearly intended - those on net
income - because these exceptions go far toward proving the
rule. The rule has already been stated, if not proven, and those
taxes which come clearly within it do not generally make any
contribution to the decisions on qualification.113  These will
qualify for credit even where the permissible deductions do not
conform exactly with U.S. permitted deductions, but "the funda-
mental issue,"" 4 as plainly indicated by the series of decisions
already discussed, is the tax base. The creditability of taxes using
gross means to a net end also indicates that the precise formula-
tion of that net gain is unimportant. This general trend is
equally evident from the decisions concerning a category very
closely related to that of taxes on gross income; that is, formulary
or estimated income taxes.
To the extent that there is actually a gap between taxes on
gross income, discussed above, and formulary or estimated taxes,
discussed below, that gap is nicely bridged by the Seatrains case.
In Seatrains, the Cuban government had brought in a 3%
tax on gross income as the direct successor to a 6% tax on net.
That lineage obviously aided the Board by pointing clearly to
an intention to tax net income; furthermore, the reason for the
change was known. This was, then, the paradigm tax of the
category last examined. Yet, was it not also a formulary tax,
a tax which employed a formula to estimate net income? In
Commissioner v. American Metal Co.," 5 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit referred to the Seatrains case and impliedly
acquiesced in the taxpayer's characterization of it as crediting a
formulary tax. The reason is not hard to find since the adjust-
ment between 3% and 6% in order to allow for a different base
is itself a fairly simple formula. But other, more complex formula-
tions have been considered and credited.
Two decisions on formulary income taxes dealt with tax
systems which offered them as an option to tax on net income.
In 1926, the Service allowed credit for such a Brazilian tax,
computed as a fixed percentage of gross receipts, the percentage
113. For uninformative decisions which allow credit without adding to the body
of reasoning on the subject, see Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 386; I.T. 4100,
1952-2 Cum. BULL. 140; I.T. 4023, 1950-2 Cum. BULL. 49; I.T. 4014, 1950-1 Cum.
BULL. 67; I.T. 3837, 1947-1 Cum. BULL. 56, and others.
114. OWENS, supra note 13, at 36.
115. 221 F.2d 134.
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having been fixed by a technical committee. 116 The other,"7 in
which the alternative of a true tax on net income was offered
only if proof of that net gain were offered to the government,
imposed a percentage tax on the gross amounts of freight from
passenger fares and cargo on non-resident corporations engaged
in transportation between the Dominican Republic and other
countries. This, too, was held creditable, but the way in which
the alternative, net tax was made available seems to speak of
administrative convenience. The fact that this was a tax imposed
specifically on nonresident corporations also allows the likeli-
hood-of-net-gain rationale into the picture, so that there is a
range of possible reasons for allowing the credit. However, the
ground on which the credit was in fact allowed was that this
was a formulary tax designed to reach net income.
Another type of formulation, even further removed from any
measure of net gain, was held to qualify in the case of Herbert
Ide Keen"l8 which concerned a French tax levied upon estimated
income, the estimate being based on the amount of rental pay-
ments made by the taxpayer. This was a minimum tax, imposed
only when the income tax otherwise payable fell below the
amount thus computed. That factor alone would seem to dis-
qualify the tax, applying any of the discernible first principles,
but the Board of Tax Appeals held otherwise. It may be doubted
whether the same tax would qualify today if challenged, particu-
larly in view of certain language of the decision:
Whatever may be the nature of the tax, it is imposed upon
what the French Government determines to be income....
The fact that under the law the taxable income is determined
in a manner different from the taxable income under the
Revenue Act of 1921 does not change the nature of the tax.
The fact that the net income of the petitioner as computed
under the Revenue Act of 1921 was much in excess of the
income of the petitioner determined for the purposes of the
French tax does not change the character of the tax paid." 9
This statement is very much in line with certain dicta of the
Supreme Court almost twenty years before, to the effect that
"much weight" should be given to the characterizations of the
116. G.C.M. 800, V-1 CuM. BULL. 75 (1926).
117. I.T. 3997, 1950-1 CUM. BULL. 63.
118. 6 B.T.A. 275 (1927), nonacq.
119. 15 B.T.A. 1243, 1246 (1929), acq., IX-1 CUM. BULL. 28 (1930).
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lawmaking power.12 0 But it appears to be contrary to the rule
in Biddle, decided nine years later. Indeed, against this back-
ground the Biddle case has been described as "an abrupt turn-
about." Part of the holding in Keasbey & Mattison also seem
to conflict with Keen:
It seems logical to conclude that any tax, if it is to qualify
as a tax on income,... is subject to the same basic restric-
tions . . .121
as are income taxes under federal law. Further, it seems to
have been relevant to the Board in Keen that petitioner's liability
under U.S. law exceeded its liability under French. Had this not
been so, it may be that even in the halcyon days before Biddle,
that "extra" part of the French tax would have been fatal to the
whole. And yet, despite this apparent conflict with more recent
decisions - Biddle, Keasbey & Mattison - as recently as 1953,
a Haitian tax which contained almost identical provisions for
assessment based on rental payments was credited by the Service
with specific qualification of that element of the tax. Keen was
expressly followed.122
In response to the Commissioner's withdrawing his non-
acquiescence in the Santa Eulalia case,123 the Service revoked two
rulings, 124 one of which had denied credit for a Mexican tax which
required an advance payment of 3% of the value of the merchan-
dise exported. This payment was refundable to the extent that
it exceeded 35% of gross annual receipts, the burden being on
the taxpayer to show that it did. The court in Santa Eulalia
(which concerned a royalty tax levied on gross receipts) used
very broad language to suggest that an intention to tax net gain,
coupled with a great likelihood of reaching it, should satisfy
§ 901 even where the method of computation "does not conform
strictly to that by which income taxes are computed under our
own laws.' 25 It was this language that the Service evidently
thought "broad enough to warrant the application of [Santa
Eulalia] to the provisions of the Mexican law.... ,,16
120. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 145 (1910).
121. 133 F.2d at 897.
122. Rev. Rul. 53-272, 1953-2 CuM. BULL. 56.
123. Supra note 95.
124. I.T. 3787, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 232.
125. 2 T.C. 241, 245 (1943).
126. I.T. 3787, 1946-1 CuM. BULL. 232.
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The persistent problem in dealing with these formulary, or
estimated, taxes upon net income is exactly parallel with the
fundamental problem in dealing with taxes on gross income: how
can they be distinguished from other formulary taxes? The an-
swer may be that they cannot; that where the rationale behind
the taxing country's choice of formula happens to be clear, as in
Seatrains, or where the tax is levied under a general income tax
statute, then the Service and the courts will allow credit. As
with the decisions concerning taxes on gross income, it seems
that the element of purpose, or intent, is better fitted for the
role of supporting justification than for determination of credit-
ability. After all, if the purpose of the credit is the alleviation of
some measure of double taxation, the only relevant test is of the
result in the particular case. Of course, when American tribunals
work their way through the unknown territory of a strange tax
system, the intentions of its creator are useful signposts to ulti-
mate result. But since the taxpayer seeking credit knows the
American world of taxation, and of accounting, the tribunal and
the taxpayer between them should be able to discern the actual
result in American terms. Conceptually, if not practically, the
purpose or intention of the taxing country can be no more than a
helpful pointer.
C. Nature of the Income
Almost all decisions on the foreign income tax credit have
concerned corporate income. This may reasonably be divided
into general revenue from the conduct of business abroad and
specific revenue from those activities of a U.S. corporation which,
for one reason or another, take place in a foreign country. Most
of the decisions discussed so far, that is those construing income
taxes other than those laid directly upon net income, have been
concerned with specific rather than general revenue. Given that
a substantial part of the business conducted by American corpora-
tions in other countries is conducted there because natural re-
sources, expertise and other factors militate in favor of the particu-
lar venue, it is not surprising that much of the income which has
been subject to these taxes has been of the specific type. Neither
is it surprising, even where the imposition is made under a general
income tax law, that the method of computation is either formu-
lary or on gross income. It does not make much sense to isolate
that part of a series of operations which happens to occur in a
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particular country, and then to attempt computation of net in-
come. Taxing authorities interested in revenue attempt to levy
it as effectively as they can from operations occurring within their
domain.
Administrative convenience may indeed be the determinative
factor in the design of these taxes. In response to the general
pattern, the U.S. tribunals, consciously or otherwise, have de-
veloped a series of rationalizations which take account of the
facts of commercial life and succeed in allowing credit, despite
the absence of detailed computation on the lines of domestic
income under the Internal Revenue Code. In a real sense, this
has been done in spite of the statutory provisions; at least once
they were construed as applying only to U.S.-type income. This
aspect of the development of the credit for foreign income taxes
should give food for thought to those who consider its objectives
worthy of continued effort.
It has already been noted that taxes which are clearly within
the "net" category have largely looked after themselves and have
not contributed to the definitional question under examination. 27
These taxes have usually involved general rather than specific
revenue and so have presented no computation problem for the
authorities immediately concerned. However, a few such general
revenue situations have resulted in a denial of credit, and brief
mention of these will complete the picture.
In 1929, a Peruvian tax on the export of sugar was denied
credit simply on the grounds that an export tax is not an income
tax.12 Two decisions denied credit for French turnover taxes
because, in taxing the general revenue of businesses, they did
not take account of the deductions for business expenses permitted
under U.S. law. 29 Similarly, in the Mallouk case, 80 a Philippine
tax on the value of goods exported failed to qualify because not
"imposed upon income or profits, either gross or net. .... 31
So, too, did a tax imposed under the Cuban Gross Receipts and
Sales Tax Law, because it was not levied upon net profits. .3 2
127. Supra note 113.
128. I.T. 2499, VIII-2 Cum. BULL. 325 (1929).
129. G.C.M. 8478, IX-2 CuM. BULL. 224 (1930); Eitington-Schild, 21 B.T.A.
1163 (1931).
130. 34 B.T.A. 269 (1936).
131. Id. at 273.
132. I.T. 3249, 1940-2 CuM. BULL. 136.
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The contours of the credit for income taxes are by now
familiar enough. It is a curiosity of the area that few decisions
wrestle with the minutiae of permissible deductions, making that
the determinant of creditability. This indicates either a basic
similarity between net taxes the world over (or at least where
U.S. taxpayers have found their way), or a lack of concern, among
the courts and the Service, for conformity beyond the distinct
notion of net gain which appears in the many decisions on taxes
which get at that gain indirectly. It would be inconsistent to
demand a greater conformity with United States concepts from
direct taxes on net gain than from those which are credited de-
spite their approximations of that gain. The fact remains that
the main efforts of the decision-making bodies have been directed
toward analyzing those taxes which get at the net gain by some
route other than the obvious.
III. Purpose
Even a tax levied directly upon net income could, presumably,
be levied for a purpose other than the raising of revenue, and so
fail to satisfy the purpose requirement generally accepted as
necessary for credit under § 901. For example, this country has
seen the imposition of domestic taxes, such as those on child
labor and the processing of food products,133 which, though com-
puted upon net income and levied as income taxes, were held
to be an unconstitutional exercise of power by the Federal Govern-
ment. But here the question is not a constitutional one, and if
the evil at which the tax credit is aimed is double taxation, the
evil exists quite independently of the motive of the taxing power.
Only one case has involved the denial of credit wholly on the
133. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture, 259 U.S. 20 (1922), concerned the Child Labor
Tax Law and declared it unconstitutional even though the tax was levied upon net
income. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), declared unconstitutional a
processing tax computed upon the difference between farm and exchange values of
farm products. The Court declared that, "the tax can only be sustained by ignoring
the avowed purpose and operation of the act and holding it a measure merely laying
an excise upon processors to raise revenue for the support of government" 297 U.S.
at 58. For further judicial examination of the problems of motive in tax legislation,
see United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953); United States v. Sanchez, 340
U.S. 42 (1950) ; Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937) ; United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) ; Nigro v. United States, 276 U.S. 332 (1928);
Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922) ; McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904);
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
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grounds of purpose, 3 4 so that the point need not be labored.
There have, however, been other suggestions that certain pur-
poses (already discussed in the context of methods of computa-
tion) would suffice to disqualify a tax levied on net gains. It may
not be too much to say that the method of computation gives
rise to a presumption as to purpose, but the decisions on point
show the ways in which any such presumption may be rebutted.
The first case on point was Havana Electric Railway which
involved public utilities in Cuba, owned by the U.S. taxpayer. 135
The taxpayer succeeded in persuading the Board of Tax Appeals
that the tax levied on his net income was not a franchise tax,
but the Board explicitly recognized the possibility that such a
tax would fail to qualify, however computed. There is a similar
suggestion in the Keasbey & Mattison case, already dis-
cussed,13 in which credit was actually denied because the levy
was not upon net income. The court went on to give as a second
ground the fact that this was not an income, but an excise tax.
To what extent the second holding was independent of the first
is not clear. The American Metal case was another 37 to discuss.
the hallmarks of a privilege tax in such a way as to imply that.
they could be fatal to creditability however the tax was assessed.
Two cases concerned with the creditability of Canadian taxes
levied on insurance premiums, irrespective of gain, denied credit
on that basis, but in each there was specific mention of the
purpose of the tax as an independent criterion in qualifying for
credit. 38
The only case to meet the issue head on, by disqualifying
a net income tax precisely because of the purpose of the levy,
was New York and Honduras Rosaria Mining Company v. Com-
missioner, 39 which is discussed further in the context of § 903,.
134. New York and Honduras Rosaria Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 745.
(2d Cir. 1948) rev'g 8T.C. 1232 (1947).
135. Havana Electric Railway, Light & Power Co., 34 B.T.A. 782 (1936), rev'd"
on rehearing, 29 B.T.A. 1151 (1934).
136. 133 F.2d 894.
137. 221 F.2d 134.
138. I.T. 3211, 1938-2 CuM. BULL. 177; 40 B.T.A. 540 (1939); I.T. 3138, 1937-2,
Cums. BULL. 230. For a more detailed discussion of the same tax, see St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Reynolds, 44 F. Supp. 863 (D. Minn. 1942).
139. 168 F.2d 745.
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below. So, too, is a recent decision concerning taxes on insurance
premiums which may cast doubt on the last two cases discussed.
In New York and Honduras, the Tax Court (ultimately re-
versed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit) held that,
notwithstanding that this tax was on a net income base, it was a
privilege tax, and so was not within the purview of the credit
provisions. This was a rare species of tax indeed: having suc-
ceeded in meeting the most rigorous requirements of the credit,
it failed on the issue of purpose. The court listed five factors
which marked the tax as a privilege tax. Honduras had no general
income tax law; the government owned the mines and permitted
,exploitation only on certain conditions, which included payment
,of this tax; payment was consideration for the right to mine under
a contract between government and taxpayer; there was no
uniformity of tax rate between different mines and, finally, for-
feiture of a mandatory advance payment would result from
suspension of mining operations. All these spelled "franchise"
or "privilege" to the Tax Court, but not to the Court of Appeals,
which focused on the absence of a forfeiture-of-mining rights
provision found in other Honduras taxes, as well as the computa-
tion, on "liquid profits," which satisfied United States notions of
net income. The court went on to say of the non-refundable
.advance payment: "but the taxpayer has not stopped opera-
tions.' 140 It was this last factor, the non-refundable advance
payment, which surely marks the tax as something other than
an income tax. The court's inability to deal intelligently with
the Commissioner's argument, that non-refundability of the ad-
vance payment marked this as something other than an income
tax, highlights the weakness of elevating "purpose" over "result"p
in determining creditability. Even the particular purpose of the
tax, when applied to this taxpayer, cannot give as good a guide
to the central question of double taxation as an inquiry as to the
:actual effect of the tax. Any inquiry as to purpose is best avoided.
In practice, the search is often fruitless and, in any event, the
-factor is irrelevant to the mischief at which the tax credit is
supposed to be directed.
In conclusion, it seems safe to say that here, as elsewhere
in the area, it is the method of computation which almost always
governs. This is the one consistent feature of virtually all the
decisions discussed in this paper.
140. Id. at 749.
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IV. Taxes in Lieu of Income Taxes
Taxes credited under § 903, as taxes in lieu of income taxes,
remain to be discussed. It should be said at the outset that the
statutory language, and I.R.S. Regulation § 1.903-1, have com-
bined to limit the effect of this provision to what might be called a
Seatrains situation, and little more. That case resulted in credit
under § 131 (predecessor to § 901) and was decided shortly before
the "in lieu" credit was enacted in 1942.1'1 The statutory language
of § 903 states that for the purposes of the credit under § 901:
the term "income, war profits and excess profits taxes" shall
include a tax paid in lieu of a tax on income, war profits,
or excess profits otherwise generally imposed by any foreign
country or by any possession of the United States.
The most important limitation contained in that language, though
sometimes erroneously attributed to the Service's interpreta-
tion,142 is the phrase "otherwise generally imposed... ." Without
that, the provision could have been applied to any tax which,
by any route, resulted in a levy upon that wealth which would
have been reached by an income, etc., tax. The requirement that
a generally applicable tax exist in the country in question has
raised a few problems over the exact nature of that tax, in rela-
tion to credit under § 903,43 but these need not concern us.
141. Seatrains was decided in May, 1942. The "in lieu" provision became § 158(f)
of the Revenue Act of 1942, effective January 1, 1942.
142. See letters of Senator Walter F. George, former Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, to the Secretary and Undersecretary of the Treasury, dated May
29, 1952 and August 10, 1954. [1956] 3 Std. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 4312; see
[1977] 6 Std. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 1 4312.
143. See particularly Compania Embotelladora Coca-Cola S.A. v. United States,
139 F. Supp. 953 (Ct. Cl. 1956). In this case, under an income tax statute of general
application, the government of Cuba levied a tax on the net profits of the taxpayer.
These were paid and credited against domestic tax liability under § 131(a) [now
§ 901]. The Commissioner argued that this barred the taxpayer from crediting under
§ 131(h) [now § 903], as a tax paid "in lieu of" an income tax, a production tax
levied on the manufacture, sale or consumption of, among other things, soft drinks.
Prior to the promulgation of the general income tax law in 1941, payment of the
production tax exempted any taxpayer from the Cuban profits tax. This was a tax on
the profits of corporations and was Cuba's first income tax of general application. In
the instant case, the Government conceded that this exemption qualified the production.
tax as a tax "in lieu of" an income tax under [§ 903] prior to the introduction of a
general income tax from which this taxpayer was not exempt. Once that was intro-
duced, ran the argument, the production tax could no longer qualify as a tax "in lieu"
because the new tax was, in effect, a substitute for the older and less general tax
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Regulation § 1.903-1 further restricted the "in lieu" provision;
its three requirements deserve brief mention. First, there must
be "in force a general income tax law"; this mirrors the statutory
requirement, save that there is no mention of war profits and
excess profits taxes. Second, but for a specific provision appli-
cable to him, the taxpayer must be subject to that generally
applicable income tax. This has been interpreted to include the
"in lieu" tax as such a specific provision, even where not expressly
stated.4 4 Third, the tax for which credit is sought must be in
lieu of, not in addition to, a generally applicable tax. Certain
taxes have been denied credit because supplementary'4 5 and in
the American Metal case,' 46 the unsuccessful argument was that
the tax was there partially in lieu of income tax.
The example given by the Service in Regulation § 1.903-1
is of a gross tax levied in lieu of a net tax because:
The ascertainment of taxable income, though not the deter-
mination of gross income, . . . is found administratively
difficult.
It has already been noted that this does not go beyond the
Seatrains decision, that the Service has never acquiesced in that
decision, and that the identical Cuban tax was later credited
under the "in lieu" provision. 147
from which the taxpayer was exempt The Court of Claims rejected this contention
holding, for the taxpayer, that because the production tax continued to provide exemp-
tion from the profits tax (which would otherwise be levied in addition to the newer
income tax, both being creditable) it continued fo be creditable under [§ 903].
144. E.g., in Northwestern Mutual Fire Association v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d
133 (9th Cir. 1950), rev'g 12 T.C. 498 (1949), the court held creditable a Canadian
tax on insurance companies which was older than that country's income tax. The fact
that the Canadian tax upon gross income or upon net premium income was substantially
the same as that imposed by the United States was thought crucial, as was the fact
that, older though it may be, the Canadian insurance tax seemed to explain why
insurance companies were not also subject to a general income tax. There was no
specific exemption.
145. E.g., Lanman & Kemp-Barclay & Co., 26'T.C. 582 (1956) ; Abbott Laboratories
International Co. v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 321, 331 (1958); Guantanamo &
Western Railroad Co., 31 T.C. 842, 857 (1959); Rev. Rul. 70-464, 1970-2 CuM. BULL
152; Rev. Rul. 70-21, 1970-1 CuM. BULL. 158; Rev. Rul. 68-318, 1968-1 Cum. BULL.
342; Rev. Rul. 58-3, 1958-1 CuM. BuLL. 263; Rev. Rul. 57-62, 1957-1 CuM. BULL.
241; Rev. Rul. 56-658, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 501.
146. 221 F.2d 134.
147. I.T. 3903, 1948-1 CuM. BUn. 70.
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The most important effect of the Regulation has been to
tie the category of qualifying taxes closely to that category which
qualifies under the "true" income tax provision of § 901. The
few cases under § 903" s suggest that the requirement that the
taxpayer be otherwise subject to the generally-imposed tax is
responsible for this close tie. The exception for creditability of
taxes other than those directly upon income is, in other words,
limited to those taxes resulting from exceptions made by the
taxing country. The resulting category is a small one. It requires
a relationship to profits much the same as that required under the
main credit provision. The result is that the concept of "income"
is not broadened at all. Indeed, given the possibility that the
Seatrains decision marked the beginning of a trend toward
liberalizing the application of the main provision (a trend inter-
rupted by the enactment of the "in lieu" credit), it may be that
the enactment has had virtually no effect.
The most explicit judicial suggestion that this limited effect
does not comport with congressional intention is Northwestern
Mutual Fire Association, a case concerning a Canadian tax on
the premium income of insurance companies. The particular tax
in issue was held to qualify under the "in lieu" credit, even though
it would not have qualified under the main provision for "true"
income taxes. 49 To the extent that this indicates a real extension
of the credit, it is an unusual case; indeed the court explicitly
rejected the Service's contention that a direct relationship to
profits was required. 50
In 1973, the select group'of taxes qualifying as taxes in lieu
of income taxes was increased 'by one when a Greek tax on public
148. OWENS, supra note 13, at 72-83.
149. The in lieu tax was computed as a percentage of the net.premium received by
the insurance companies. "Net premium" allowed deductions from gross premium for
rebates and cancellation refunds, but not for any of the attendant expenses of doing
business. 44 F. Supp. at 865. It.would not therefore have qualified as a foreign
income tax under the "designed to reach net gain" requirement, set forth in Bank of
America. See text accompanying note 86, supra.
150. 181 F.2d at 135. There is considerable authority contrary to Northwestern
Mutual Fire Association, denying credit. for the Canadian tax on premium income,
either because the companies involved'were not otherwise subject to the generally
applicable income tax, or because the' Canadian tax pre-dated the general income*
tax and so could not be said to be in lieu of it. This trend was reversed in a 1972
ruling, revoking several earlier rulings, in which no reason was given' for the
about-turn. This may have ended a long-standing problem for American insurers
operating in Canada. Rev. Rul. 72-84, 1972-1 CuM. BULL. 216.
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works contractors, offered as an option to a direct income tax
and very much of the administrative-convenience type, was held
to be creditable.15 1
The New York & Honduras Mining Company case 52 raises
a problem concerning the "in lieu" credit which may be of more
academic than practical import. There, the tax qualified for
credit as an income tax partly because the contract between the
taxpayer and the government, made under a general income tax
statute, satisfied certain of the creditability requirements lacking
in the statute itself. This was the computation upon "liquid
profits," which term was defined in the contract, but not in the
statute. This curious aspect of the case, which has not attracted
attention, appears to raise the question: If definitional require-
ments of the income tax credit may be satisfied by a specific
contractual agreement, even though absent from the statute itself,
would a tax levied in lieu of that tax satisfy the "in lieu ' credit
requirement that there be a generally applicable income tax?
In other words, if Honduras had levied a different tax on
certain of the mining company's operations, specifically in lieu
of that tax which qualified for credit, and specifically on the
grounds of administrative convenience, would it have qualified
for credit as a tax in lieu of an income tax? It could not properly
be argued that the agreement between taxpayer and government
was the "specific provision" but for,,which the taxpayer would
have been subject to the general income tax, for it was precisely
this provision which qualified that tax as an income tax for credit
purposes. Probably, given the application of § 903 already dis-
cussed, such a tax would not qualify for credit, even though the
one for which it was a substitute had done so. While of no great
practical importance, this peculiarity may highlight an inade-
quacy of the application of the "in lieu" credit, in relation to its
purpose. It may suggest that the New York & Honduras Mining
Company case was wrongly decided.
V. ConCluion
The general difficulty encountered in applying the foreign tax
credit has been the reconciliation of the general with the particu-
lar, the purpose with the provision designed to effect it. The
statutory provision is particular insofar as it specifies "income"
151. Rev. Rul. 73-588, 1973-2 CuM. BULL. 268.
152. 168 F.2d 745.
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taxes, but it lacks the particularity which would result from an
accompanying definition. The purpose of the credit provision is
more general, and this dissonance between the policy and its
instrument has resulted in an understandable reluctance, in the
Service and the courts, to put the language of the statute along-
side the known purpose of its drafter. The accepted purpose of
the credit provision is the mitigation of double taxation - an
imprecise concept which is best left to economists. The decisions
make no more than passing reference to the "well-known" pur-
pose of the credit, a concession to form, but a minimal aid to con-
struction.
In short, the way in which the credit for foreign income taxes
has been applied is a fair reflection of the tension between the
limited certainty of the language and the uncertain confines of
the purpose behind it. Those taxes which have been levied upon
wealth certain to include net- gain have generally been credited;
those which indicate an understanding of wealth quite different
from that reflected in the United States understanding of "in-
come" have not. There has been: no definition more certain than
that. If the resulting achieveinent is haphazard and inconsistent,
the fault is not in the tribunials which have struggled with the
problem. It is the necessary consequence of a failure to state
precisely the policy behind the credit.
